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Abstract— We present a game-theoretic approach to con-
tention control. We define a game-theoretic model, called ran-
dom access game, to capture the contention/interaction among
wireless nodes in wireless networks with contention-based
medium access. We characterize Nash equilibria of random
access games, study their dynamics and propose distributed
algorithms (strategy evolutions) to achieve the Nash equilibria.
This provides a general analytical framework that is capable
of modelling a large class of systemwide quality of service
models via the specification of per-node utility functions, in
which systemwide fairness or service differentiation can be
achieved in a distributed manner as long as each node executes
a contention resolution algorithm that is designed to achieve
the Nash equilibrium. We thus design medium access method
according to distributed strategy update mechanism achieving
the Nash equilibrium of random access game. In addition to
guiding medium access control design, the random access game
model also provides an analytical framework to understand
equilibrium and dynamic properties of different medium access
protocols and their interactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless channel is a shared medium that is interference-
limited. Contention-based medium access control (contention
control) is a distributed strategy to access and share wireless
channel among contending wireless nodes. From a control-
theoretic point of view, it consists of two components:
a contention resolution algorithm that dynamically adjusts
persistence probability or contention window in response
to contention in the network,1 and a feedback mechanism
that updates a contention measure and sends it back to
wireless nodes. Different medium access control methods
differ in terms of how they adjust persistence probability
or contention window in response to contention and what
contention measure they use. For example, the standard IEEE
802.11 DCF uses a backoff mechanism and a binary con-
tention signal – packet collision or successful transmission,
in which each wireless node doubles its contention window
upon a collision (binary exponential backoff) and sets it to
the base value upon a successful transmission [10].
The choice of contention measure and contention resolu-
tion algorithm is key to the performance of medium access
methods. “Inappropriate” choice of these two components
will result in poor performance. For example, in high-load
scenarios, 802.11 DCF results in excessive collisions and
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1Contention resolution is usually achieved through two mechanisms:
persistence and backoff [18]. In the persistence mechanism, each wireless
node maintains a persistence probability and accesses the channel with this
probability when it perceives an idle channel. In the backoff mechanism,
each wireless node maintains a contention window and waits for a random
amount of time bounded by the contention window before a transmission.
hence low throughput, because setting to the base contention
window upon successful transmissions is too drastic and each
new transmission starts with the base contention window
independent of the contention level in the network. It also
has short-term unfairness problem, due to the oscillation in
contention window. The binary exponential backoff directly
causes short-term unfairness. However, this oscillation in
contention window is unavoidable because DCF uses a
binary contention signal. In order to achieve high efficiency
(high throughput and low collision) and better fairness, we
need to stabilize the network into a steady state which sus-
tains an appropriate contention window size (or equivalently,
persistence probability) for each node.
The main motivation of this work is to provide an
analytical model to study the contention/interation among
wireless nodes and design medium access methods that could
stabilize the network around a steady state with a target
fairness (or service differentiation) and high efficiency. To
this end, we define a general game-theoretic model, called
random access game, to capture the contention/interaction
among wireless nodes in wireless networks with contention-
based medium access. Here the game-theoretic model is not
intended to model selfish behaviors of the wireless nodes,
but rather to capture the constraints encountered in real
networks. In real networks, we prefer distributed algorithms
with no or minimal explicit message passing, and each
wireless node does not know how many nodes are present,
is not aware of the actions (such as transmission or channel
access probability) of others a priori, and can only sense
limited information about the channel state (such as packets
encountering collisions, or channel being idle or busy). In
such a situation, the best a node can do is to optimize
some local or private objective and adjust its action based on
limited information about the network state. Noncooperative
game is best to model such a situation, and we design random
access game to guide individual nodes to seek an equilibrium
that achieves some systemwide performance objective.
In random access games, a player (wireless node) strategy
is its persistence probability or equivalently its contention
window size, and its payoff function includes both utility
gain from channel access and cost from packet collision.
Through the specification of per-node utility function, we can
model a large class of systemwide quality of service models,
similar to that in utility framework for network flows, see,
e.g., [14]. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of random
access games, study their dynamics and propose algorithms
(strategy evolutions) to achieve the Nash equilibrium. We
show that systemwide fairness or service differentiation can
be achieved in a distributed manner as long as each node
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executes a contention resolution algorithm that is designed
to achieve the Nash equilibrium.
Based on the understanding of the equilibrium and dynam-
ics of random access games, we propose a novel medium
access method derived from CSMA/CA in which each node
estimates its conditional collision probability and adjusts
its persistence probability or equivalently contention win-
dow accordingly. Unlike other medium access methods, our
method adapts to continuous feedback signal (conditional
collision probability) rather than binary contention signal
(packet collision or successful transmission), and each node
tries to keep a fixed persistence probability or equivalently
contention window specified by the Nash equilibrium of
random access game. By specifying appropriate utility func-
tions, the resulting medium access method can achieve target
fairness (or service differentiation), and better contention
control (collision reduction) and hence higher throughput.
In addition to guiding medium access control design, the
random access game model also provides an analytical
framework to understand equilibrium and dynamic properties
of different medium access protocols and their interactions.
II. RANDOM ACCESS GAME
Consider a set N of wireless nodes in a wireless LAN with
contention-based medium access. We will focus on single-
cell wireless LANs where every node can hear every other
node in the network, see [6] for the extension to multicell
wireless LANs. We consider the case of greedy nodes, i.e.,
they always have a frame to transmit. We will mainly present
our theory in terms of “channel access probability.” If a
persistence mechanism is implemented, the channel access
probability is just the persistence probability. If a backoff
mechanism is implemented, channel access probability p is
related to a constant contention window cw according to
p = 2
cw+1 . This relation can be derived under the decoupling
approximation for a set of wireless nodes with constant
contention windows, see, e.g., [3] [15].
Assume that each node i ∈ N attains a utility Ui(pi)
when it accesses the channel with probability pi ∈ [νi, ωi].
We assume that Ui(·) is continuously differentiable, strictly
concave, increasing, and with the curvatures bounded away
from zero in [νi, ωi], i.e., −1/U ′′i (pi) ≥ 1/λ > 0. Let
qi(p) := 1 −
∏
j 6=i(1 − pj) denote the conditional col-
lision probability of node i. Our objective is to choose
p := (p1, p2, . . . , p|N |) such that each node maximizes its
payoff Ui(pi)− piqi. Since wireless nodes are not aware of
channel access probabilities of others a priori, we model
their interaction as a noncooperative game. Formally, we
define a random access game as follows.
Definition 1: A random access game G is defined as a
triple G := {N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N}, where N is a set of
players (wireless nodes), player i ∈ N strategy Si :=
{pi|pi ∈ [νi, ωi]} with 0 ≤ νi < ωi ≤ 1, and payoff function
ui(p) := Ui(pi)− piqi(p) with qi(p) := 1−
∏
j 6=i(1− pj).
Note that the throughput of node i is proportional to pi
if there is no collision, and piqi is the collision probability
experienced by node i and can be seen as the “cost” resulting
from collision. Thus, the payoff function ui(·) has a nice
interpretation: the net gain of utility from channel access,
discounted by the cost due to collision.
Random access game G is defined in a rather general
manner. Each node i can choose any utility function Ui(·)
it thinks appropriate. If all nodes have the same utility
functions, the system is said to have homogeneous users. If
the nodes have different utility functions, the system is said
to have heterogeneous users. The motivation for studying
systems of heterogeneous users is to provide differentiated
services to different wireless nodes.
A. Nash Equilibrium
We now analyze the equilibrium of random access
game. The solution concept we use is the Nash equi-
librium [8]. Denote the strategy (channel access prob-
ability) selection for all nodes but i by p−i :=
(p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , p|N |), and write (pi,p−i) for
the strategy profile (p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi, pi+1, . . . , p|N |). A
vector of access probability p∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for
all nodes i ∈ N , ui(p∗i ,p∗−i) ≥ ui(pi,p∗−i) for all pi ∈ Si.
We see that the Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for
which no player has an incentive to change unilaterally. The
following result is immediate.
Theorem 2: There exists a Nash equilibrium for any ran-
dom access game G.2
Since utility function Ui(·) is concave, at the Nash equilib-
rium, p⋆i either takes value at the boundaries of the strategy
space Si or satisfies
U ′i(p
∗
i ) = qi(p
∗), (1)
where U ′i(p∗i ) =
dUi(p
∗
i
)
dpi
, the marginal utility at p∗i . We call a
Nash equilibrium p∗ a nontrivial equilibrium if, for all nodes
i, p∗i satisfies equation (1), and trivial equilibrium otherwise.
In the remainder of this section, we will mainly focus on
nontrivial Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3: Random access game G has a nontrivial Nash
equilibrium if the following condition holds:
A1: For each node i ∈ N , inverse function (U ′i)−1(qi) maps
any qi ∈ [0, 1] into a point pi ∈ Si.
The assumption A1 gives a sufficient condition for the
existence of nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Since Ui(pi) is
a continuously differentiable concave function, U ′i(pi) is
a continuous, decreasing function and so is (U ′i)−1(qi).
Without loss of generality, with the assumption A1 we
constrain the strategy space Si such that (U ′i)−1(0) = ωi
and (U ′i)−1(1) = νi in the following discussion.
Define idle probability γ(p) :=
∏
i∈N (1 − pi), and
Γi(pi) := (1 − pi)(1 − U
′
i(pi)). It follows from equation
(1) that, at nontrivial Nash equilibrium,
Γi(p
∗
i ) = γ(p
∗). (2)
Note that the right-hand side of the above equation is
independent of i. Thus, Γi(p∗i ) = Γj(p∗j ) for any i, j ∈ N .
2See [6] for complete proofs for all theorems in this paper.
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Theorem 4: Suppose A1 holds. Random access game G
has a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium if additionally the
following condition holds:
A2: Γi(pi) is a monotone function in Si for all i ∈ N .
In order to study quality of service differentiation among
wireless nodes, we further differentiate among symmetric
and asymmetric equilibria as follows.
Definition 5: A Nash equilibrium p∗ is said to be a
symmetric equilibrium if p∗i = p∗j for all i, j ∈ N , and an
asymmetric equilibrium otherwise.
For a general system of homogeneous users, both symmet-
ric and asymmetric Nash equilibria are possible. By symme-
try, if a system of homogeneous users has an asymmetric
Nash equilibrium, all its permutations are Nash equilibria.
However, for symmetric nontrivial equilibrium, it must be
unique.
Theorem 6: For a system of homogeneous users, if ran-
dom access game G has symmetric nontrivial Nash equilib-
rium, it must be unique. More generally, for a system with
several classes of homogeneous users, if G has symmetric
nontrivial Nash equilibrium,3 it must be unique.
Since by symmetry there must be multiple asymmetric
Nash equilibria if there exists any, the following result
follows directly from Theorems 4 and 6.
Corollary 7: For a system of homogeneous users, sup-
pose A1 and A2 hold, then random access game G has a
unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium which is a symmetric
equilibrium. More generally, for a system with several classes
of homogeneous users, under the same assumptions, G has
a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium which is symmetric
among each class of users.
Corollary 7 is a powerful result. It guarantees the unique-
ness of nontrivial Nash equilibrium, and moreover, it guar-
antees fair sharing of wireless channel among the same class
of wireless nodes and provides service differentiation among
different classes of wireless nodes. This will facilitate the
analysis of dynamic property of random access games and
the design of medium access control.
B. Dynamics of Random Access Game
The dynamics of game studies how interacting players
could converge to a Nash equilibrium. It is a difficult problem
in general, as pointed out in [8] that “game theory lacks a
general and convincing argument that a Nash outcome will
occur.” In the setting of random access, players (wireless
nodes) can observe the outcome (packet collision or suc-
cessful transmission) of the actions of others, but do not
have direct knowledge of other player actions and payoffs.
We consider repeated play of random access game, and look
for update mechanism in which players repeatedly adjust
strategies in response to observations of other player actions
so as to achieve the Nash equilibrium.
We consider a strategy update mechanism called gradient
play [7]. In gradient play, every player adjusts a current
3For a system with several classes of users, a Nash equilibrium is
symmetric if at equilibrium the users of the same class choose the same
strategy.
channel access probability gradually in a gradient direction
suggested by observations of other player actions. Mathe-
matically, each node i ∈ N updates its strategy according
to
pi(t + 1) = [pi(t) + fi(pi(t))(U
′
i(pi(t))− qi(p(t)))]
Si , (3)
where the stepsize fi(·) > 0 can be a function of the
strategy of player i, and “Si” denotes the projection onto
the player i strategy space. The gradient play admits a
nice economic interpretation, by considering the conditional
collision probability qi as contention price for node i. If the
marginal utility U ′i(pi) is greater than contention price, we
increase the access probability, and if the marginal utility is
less than contention price, we decrease the access probability.
The following result is immediate.
Lemma 8: By the definition of nontrivial Nash equilib-
rium, nontrivial Nash equilibria of random access game G
are fixed points of the gradient play (3) and vice versa.
Theorem 9: Suppose A1 and A2 hold, the gradient play
(3) converges to the unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium of
random access game G if for any i ∈ N , the stepsize fi(pi) <
1
λ+|N |−1 .
Proof: By Lyapunov method using Lyapunov function
V (p) :=
∑
i∈N (Ui(pi) − pi) −
∏
i∈N (1 − pi). See [6] for
details.
Theorem 9 guarantees the convergence of distributed gra-
dient play to the desired Nash equilibrium. If a backoff
mechanism is implemented, each node i ∈ N updates its
contention window cwi as follows:
cwi(t) =
2− pi(t)
pi(t)
. (4)
Remark: For a general game model, there may exist mul-
tiple nontrivial Nash equilibria. In this situation, a “naive”
strategy such as best response or gradient play may not
converge to the desired equilibrium, and concepts from
control theory may come in to work, see, e.g., [19].
C. Medium Access Control Design
Corollary 7 and Theorem 9 suggest that random access
games provide a general analytical framework to model a
large class of systemwide quality of service models (mainly
in terms of throughput) via the specification of per-node
utility functions, and systemwide fairness or service differ-
entiation can be achieved in a distributed manner as long as
each node executes a contention resolution algorithm that is
designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium.
Based on this understanding of the equilibrium and dy-
namics of random access games, we propose a novel medium
access method derived from CSMA/CA: instead of executing
exponential backoff upon collisions, each node estimates
its conditional collision probability and adjusts its channel
access probability and contention window according to gra-
dient play (3) and (4), see Table I for a formal description.
Unlike other medium access methods, our method adapts to
continuous feedback signal (conditional collision probability)
rather than binary feedback (packet collision), and stabilizes
46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. 12-14, 2007 ThB05.4
3430
the network around a steady state specified by the Nash
equilibrium of random access game. Our access method
is an equation-based control, and its performance (such as
throughput, collision and fairness) is determined by the Nash
equilibrium. Note that U ′i(pi(t)) − qi(p(t)) specifies how
far the current state is from the equilibrium. The contention
window adjustment is small when the current state is close
to the equilibrium and large otherwise, independent of where
the equilibrium is. This is in sharp contrast to the approach
taken by 802.11 DCF, where window adjustment depends on
just the current window size and is independent of where the
current state is with respect to the target equilibrium. So, our
access method can achieve better contention control (colli-
sion reduction) and better short-term fairness. By specifying
appropriate utility functions, the resulting access method can
achieve better balance/tradeoff between channel access and
collision avoidance, and hence a higher throughput.
TABLE I
MEDIUM ACCESS METHOD VIA GRADIENT PLAY
After each transmission
{
/*wireless node observes n idle
slots before a transmission*/
isum ← isum + n
ntrans ← ntrans + 1
if(ntrans >= maxtrans){
/*compute the estimator*/
n¯ ← isum
ntrans
qi ←
1−(n¯+1)pi
(n¯+1)(1−pi)
/*update access probability*/
pi ←− pi + fi(pi)(U
′
i
(pi)− qi)
/*update contention window*/
cwi ←−
2−pi
pi
/*reset variables*/
isum ← 0
ntrans ← 0
}
}
Furthermore, wireless nodes can estimate conditional col-
lision probabilities by observing idle period of the channel.
Let n denote the number of consecutive idle slots between
two transmissions. Here “a transmission” corresponds to a
busy period in the channel when only a node transmits
(i.e., a successful transmission) or multiple nodes transmit
simultaneously (i.e., a collision). Since n has the geometric
distribution with parameter γ(p), its mean n¯ is given by
n¯ = γ(p)1−γ(p) . Thus, each node can estimate its conditional
collision probability by observing the average number of
consecutive idle slots, according to
qi = 1−
γ(p)
1− pi
=
1− (n¯ + 1)pi
(n¯ + 1)(1− pi)
. (5)
So, our access method can decouple contention control from
handling packet losses, and is immune to those problems
incurred in methods that infer channel contention from
packet collisions.
In the next section, we will study a concrete random access
game and the corresponding medium access control design,
as a case study for the proposed design methodology in
game-theoretic framework.
III. A CASE STUDY
Consider the following utility
Ui(pi) :=
1
ai
(
(ai − 1)ωi
ai
ln (aipi − ωi)− pi), (6)
where 0 < ωi < 1, ai > 1 and pi ∈ [2ωi/(1 + ai), ωi].
Define a random access game G1 in the same way as in
Definition 1 with the above player utility functions and
strategy spaces.
A. Equilibrium and Dynamics
We have the following result regarding the Nash equilib-
rium of random access game G1.
Theorem 10: If aiωi < 1, random access game G1 has
unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Moreover, for a system
of homogeneous users the unique nontrivial Nash equilib-
rium of G1 is a symmetric equilibrium, and for a system with
several classes of homogeneous users the unique nontrivial
Nash equilibrium of G1 is symmetric among each class of
users.
Assume that each node i ∈ N adjusts its strategy accord-
ing to gradient play
pi(t + 1) = [pi(t) + fi(pi(t))(
ωi − pi(t)
aipi(t)− ωi
− qi(p(t)))]
Si ,
(7)
cwi(t) =
2− pi(t)
pi(t)
, (8)
The following result follows directly from Theorem 9.
Theorem 11: Suppose aiωi < 1, the system described
by equation (7) converges to the unique nontrivial Nash
equilibrium of random access game G1 if fi(pi) < 1λ+|N |−1 .
The condition aiωi < 1 is a mild assumption and admits a
very large region in parameter space. The Nash equilibrium
can be easily calculated numerically. Note that Γi(pi) =
(1−pi)((1+ai)pi−2ωi)
aipi−ωi
is a decreasing function of ωi and an
increasing function of ai. Since Γi is an increasing function
of pi, larger value of ωi and/or smaller value of ai will results
in larger channel access probability p∗i at equilibrium. Thus,
in order to provide differentiated services, we can choose
larger value of ωi and/or smaller value of ai for the users
of a higher priority class. For example, in wireless access
network, we can assign a large ωi value and/or small ai
value to the access point, because usually downlink traffic is
greater than the traffic of mobile nodes.
B. Medium Access Control Design
We design a medium access method according to chan-
nel access probability and contention window update algo-
rithm (7)–(8), by modifying a Carrier Sense Multiple Ac-
cess/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) access method such
as 802.11 DCF (see reference [10] for for a description of
the channel access mechanism in DCF). As described in
subsection II-C, our medium access method makes two key
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modifications to 802.11 DCF. Instead of adjusting contention
window cwi to a binary feedback signal and using exponen-
tial backoff algorithm, each node i estimates its conditional
collision probability qi, which is a continuous feedback, and
adjusts cwi according to algorithm (7)–(8).
There are several parameters in our medium access
method. The parameters ωi and ai determine the equi-
librium properties such as throughput, loss (collision) and
fairness. The parameters fi(·) and maxtrans determine the
dynamical properties such as stability and responsiveness. In
practice, we will choose a constant stepsize for all nodes (for
example, a constant stepsize that accommodates a large range
from several to tens of nodes in a single cell). The number
of transmissions, maxtrans, for each node before updating
its channel access probability and contention window, affects
the convergence speed and the accuracy of the conditional
collision probability estimation. Since by gradient play nodes
update pi and cwi gradually, in order to achieve a good
tradeoff between convergence speed and estimation accuracy
we will choose a relatively small value for maxtrans and
estimate average number of consecutive idle slots between
transmissions using an exponential weighted running average
n¯ ←− βn¯ + (1− β)
isum
ntrans
,
where β ∈ [0, 1). If β is small we weight history less, and if
β is large we weight history more. By choosing appropriate
β value, exponential weighted running average gives better
estimate than the “naive” estimator isum/ntrans.
C. Performance
To evaluate the performance of our medium access
method, we develop a discrete-event simulator that im-
plements our method and the standard 802.11 DCF basic
access method. The values for the parameters used to obtain
numerical results are as follows. The system values are those
specified in the 802.11b standard with DSSS PHY layer [10].
In all simulations, we use a data rate of 11Mbps and packet
payload of 12000 bits, and set the following values of the
control parameters: maxtrans = 10, fi = 0.01 and β = 0.2.
Also, the physical layer is assumed to be perfect for the
numerical experiments reported in this subsection.
1) Throughput and Collision Overhead: We consider a
system of homogeneous users, and compare the throughput
achieved by our method and DCF. In our design each node i
is limited to choose a contention window size between 2−ω
ω
and 1+a−ω
ω
, corresponding to channel access probability pi ∈
[ 2ω
a+1 , ω]. To compare the performance of our design with that
of DCF on the same ground, we choose values for those
related parameters such that 2−ω
ω
= CWmin and 1+a−ω
ω
=
2mCWmax, corresponding to a maximum backoff stage m.
In our numerical experiments with DCF we also assume that
after a packet’s (m+1)th failed transmission the contention
window resets to CWmin. This is also equivalent to the
packet being discarded after m failed retransmissions.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the comparison of aggregate
throughput and collision overhead between our design (ω =
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Fig. 1. Throughput comparison.
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Fig. 2. Conditional collision probability comparison.
0.0606, a = 14.576) and DCF (CWmin = 32, CWmax =
256). We see that our access method achieves better trade-
off between channel access and collision avoidance, and
hence higher throughput that is sustainable over a large
range of numbers of competing nodes. We then compare
the numerical values from simulations with the analytical
values of throughput and conditional collision probability
that are calculated with Nash equilibrium of random access
game G1, and confirm that they match extremely well. This
proves that our medium access method does converge to
the desired Nash equilibrium of the random access game.
We also track the evolution of contention windows, which
approach quickly to and stay around the values specified by
the Nash equilibrium.
2) Fairness: In our access method for a system of ho-
mogeneous users, wireless nodes have the same contention
window size, specified by the symmetric Nash equilibrium of
random access game G1. Thus, it is expected to have a better
short-term fairness. Figure 3 compares short-term fairness of
our access method and DCF using Jain fairness index for the
window sizes that are multiples of the number of wireless
nodes [12]. We can see that our method provide better short-
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term fairness than 802.11 DCF.
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3) Service Differentiation: As discussed before, we can
provide service differentiation by choosing different utility
functions for different classes of users. Regarding the con-
crete medium access method we consider, each node i will
receive different services by choosing different values for
parameters ωi or ai. For the simplicity of presentation, we
consider two classes of users. Assume that class 1 has n1
users with parameters (ω1, a1), corresponding to a higher
priority of service, and class 2 has n2 users with parameters
(ω2, a2), corresponding to a lower priority of service. Let
first study the impact of ωi on the service differentiation
by setting the same ai value. The upper panel in Figure 4
shows the throughput ratio of a class 1 node to a class 2 node
versus the total number of nodes for two different scenarios:
two classes have equal number of users, and class 1 has
fixed number of users. We see that, as the total number of
nodes increase, the throughput ratio approaches 1.5. Indeed,
a simple calculation can show that the throughput ratio
between users of different classes is approximately ω1
ω2
for
a large number of users. We then study the impact of ai
on the service differentiation by setting the same ωi value.
The lower panel in Figure 4 shows the throughput ratio of
a class 1 node to a class 2 node versus the total number of
nodes for the scenario where two classes have equal number
of users and the scenario where class 1 has fixed number of
users. We see that, as the total number of nodes increase,
the throughput ratio seems to converge to some fixed value.
Again, a simple calculation can show that the throughput
ratio will approach 1+a21+a1 .
IV. UTILITY FUNCTION AND REVERSE ENGINEERING
As we see from the above discussions, utility functions
determine Nash equilibria of random access games and
thus the equilibrium (steady) operating points of medium
access control protocols. Conversely, utility functions are
determined by the equilibrium (steady) operating points of
medium access control protocols. Since the medium access
control protocol adapts channel access probability pi ac-
cording to current access probability and packet collision,
the equilibrium operating point defines an implicit relation
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Fig. 4. The throughput ratio of a class 1 node to a class 2 node. Upper
panel: (ω1 = 0.06, a1 = 15) and (ω2 = 0.04, a2 = 15); Lower panel:
(ω1 = 0.04, a1 = 10) and (ω2 = 0.04, a2 = 20).
between equilibrium channel access probability pi and con-
ditional collision probability qi,
pi = Fi(pi, qi). (9)
Assume Fi is continuously differentiable and ∂Fi/∂qi 6= 0
in [0, 1]. Then, by implicit function theorem, there exists a
unique continuously differentiable function Fi such that
qi = Fi(pi). (10)
Define the utility function of each node i as
Ui(pi) =
∫
Fi(pi)dpi. (11)
With the above defined utility functions, we can define a
random access game as in section II. Hence, we can reverse
engineer medium access control protocols and study them
in game theory framework: medium access control can be
interpreted as a distributed strategy update algorithm to
achieve the Nash equilibrium of the random access game.
For example, if we are first given the medium access
method presented in subsection III-B, it can be interpreted
as a distributed strategy update algorithm to achieve the
Nash equilibrium of random access game G1 that is defined
with the utility functions determined by the equilibrium of
equation (7). Take another example, 802.11 DCF. It is well
established that for a single-cell wireless LAN at steady state,
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channel access probability p relates to conditional collision
probability as follows [3]:
p =
2(1− 2q)
(1− 2q)(CWmin + 1) + qCWmin(1− (2q)m)
,
where CWmin is the base contention window and m is the
maximum backoff stage. Following procedures (10)–(11) to
derive a utility function, we can define a random access game
and interpret DCF as distributed strategy update algorithm
to achieve the corresponding Nash equilibrium. Note that,
however, the dynamics of 802.11 DCF cannot be described
by gradient play.
The random access game model can be used to analyze
equilibrium properties such as throughput, collision and
fairness of different medium access control protocols. When
wireless nodes in a wireless LAN deploy different medium
access protocols with different contention measures, we
can also study the coexistence and interaction of different
protocols in the random access game framework.
V. RELATED WORK
Much effort has been devoted to applying game-theoretic
approach to study random access, see, e.g., [13] [17] [4] [5]
[20]. The work closest to ours is Jin et al. [13] that studies
noncooperative equilibrium of Aloha networks and their local
convergence, and Borkar et al. [4] that studies distributed
scheme for adapting random access. Our motivation, model
and results are different from those work. ˇCagalj et al. [5]
studies selfish behavior in CSMA/CA networks and propose
a distributed protocol to guide multiple selfish nodes to a
Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium. In contrast, we use game-
theoretic model to capture the information and implemen-
tation constraints encountered in real networks and design
games to guide distributed users to achieve systemwide
performance objectives. Another major difference of our
work from most other game-theoretic works is that we
take a control-theoretic viewpoint and regard channel access
probabilities as dynamic variables. As such, we define a
general utility for each user directly in terms of its channel
access probability, and specify a special structure for random
access game that respects the distributed and adaptive nature
of contention-based medium access.
There are many papers on various improvements to 802.11
DCF that propose better contention resolution algorithms,
see, e.g., [2] [16]. Our design is different in terms of
both contention measure and contention resolution algorithm.
There also exists extensive work on 802.11 QoS provision-
ing, see, e.g., [1] [11]. Our access method can provide more
flexible service differentiations through the specification of
per-node utility functions, except for manipulating the length
of inter-frame space. Related work also includes [9] that
proposes an idle sense access method, which compares the
mean number of idle slots between transmission attempts
with the optimal value and adopts an additive increase
and multiplicative decrease algorithm to dynamically control
the contention window in order to improve throughput and
short-term fairness. In our access method, the number of
consecutive idle slots between transmissions is only used to
estimate conditional collision probabilities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented random access game model to study the
contention/interaction among wireless nodes, and proposed
to design medium access method according to distributed
strategy update mechanism achieving the Nash equilibrium
of random access game. As a case study of medium access
control design in game-theoretic framework, we present a
concrete medium access method and show that it achieves
superior performance over the standard 802.11 DCF, and
can provide flexible service differentiations among wireless
nodes. In addition to guiding medium access control design,
the random access game model also provides an analytical
framework to understand equilibrium and dynamic properties
of different medium access protocols and their interactions.
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